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Abstract
The City of Buffalo in 1880 was a densely developed city of 180,000 people. Its
success was built upon reducing the friction of space between it (and its Great Lakes hinterland) and the Atlantic seaboard, first with the Erie Canal, then with railroads. Within
the city, people walked or used carriages and streetcars pulled by horses on iron rails.
Freight was moved mostly with horse and wagon. These were centripetal forces, concentrating people and economic activity in an ever-denser core as the city grew. Changes to
this landscape began to be seen in fundamental ways in the early 1950s, and could not
have happened without great and sustained state and federal funding for land acquisition
and clearance for highway and “Urban Renewal” projects. This destabilized the city in
ways still being felt. Thousands of people and many hundreds of businesses were forced
to move (or close). An especially significant building type—the small mixed-use building with commercial space on the ground floor and semi-public or residential uses
above—was demolished by the hundreds, fracturing the contiguity that is a necessary
component of high-quality urban space. Subsequent construction, when and where it occurred, was not supportive of pedestrians or public transportation. Consequently, Buffalo
has seen a stark decline in its spatial quality over the last 60 years, with ramifications for
its economic competitiveness and quality of life.
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Introduction	

This paper charts the elimination of the small mixed-use commercial building as a
direct consequence of Urban Renewal and highway construction, and the creation of a
landscape of much lower spatial quality—automobile storage facilities, highway interchanges, and walled-off office blocks, that resulted in “dead zones” that inhibit human
activity. This small commercial building was not unique to Buffalo, indeed, it has been a
building block of cities around the world for thousands of years. It is recognizable to the
most casual of observers: Two, three, or four stories high, the ground floor having a shop
or some kind of service generally open to the public. Residential apartments are above,
with perhaps a floor of offices or workshops in between. Built one next to the other, these
buildings create the settings for urban street life.	

When we speak of lively streets or a “street scene,” the image conjured up is one
of a populous mix of people walking and idling along a range of sidewalk or in a public
square. People will be stopped, looking in store windows, standing about talking, sitting
down eating or drinking or daydreaming or observing. People will be moving—strolling,
rushing, shambling, striding, walking aimlessly, making time, killing time. Always, the
street or square will be lined with stores, eating establishments, service places: private
places extending a public invitation. It is the image of the promenade, verb and noun. 	

It is a place of exchange. Money changes hands. Goods and services are provided.
Thoughts are shared, ideas swapped. Information is gathered and dispensed. Sometimes
the only things exchanged are pleasantries. This is the marketplace, a central place that
makes trading and social exchange efficient. It is the essence of the city.	
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Downtown Buffalo, NY in 1951 was such a central place. In the span of one generation, however,—from 1957 to 1980— downtown Buffalo was transformed from a
cluster of thousands of commercial establishments and homes, the central place of an
eight-county hinterland, into a far less populous commercial desert devoid of most central
place functions. The 30 years and more since 1980 has only deepened the somnolence of
the sidewalks. The physical transformation was deliberate and methodical, driven by
downtown elites, enabled by federal and state programs that were tapped by a politicalbureaucratic apparatus eager for easy money. All saw the traditional city as threatening
and obsolete. The apparatus measured its success by the degree to which the physical
form of the city was changed. Architects and media joined in to create a self-romanticizing coterie bent on heroic action. 	

Biases and notions of the big-store owners propelled development schemes that
led to their demise. Big banks with a proclivity for exclusive compounds (Marine Midland, M&T, Erie County Savings Bank, Buffalo Savings Bank, Norstar Bancorp, and Key
Bank) also promoted the vanquishing of the small holder, their tenants, and their tenants’
customers and visitors. The result is a downtown that is akin to a suburban office park in
its ambience.	

Clearing ground and breaking the continuum between neighborhoods and downtown sharply reduced the inventory of buildings, shops, services, and homes. Whatever
mixed-use buildings remained were no longer contiguous. Fewer and more widely separated points of origination and destination meant fewer visitors, residents, and daytime
workers.1 There was also sharp reduction in the customer base: approximately 10,000
were forced to move from areas close to downtown, contributing to a chain of events that
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caused more than 60,000 people to leave the lower East Side alone between 1950 and
1980.2 The small commercial building became ever less attractive, commanding lower
rents. Lower rents meant less maintenance and a downward spiral. Soon, the carrying
costs of a building became greater than the costs of demolition, which brought lower taxes, and when paved for parking, more net revenue than a standing building.	

Urban development in Buffalo became a matter of scoring points, a numbers
game of the local “growth machine,”3 Conceive a project, score a point; secure federal or
state financing, score a point; clear the land, score a point. Politicians, bureaucrats, and
business leaders kept score, as did The Buffalo Evening News and The Courier-Express. 	

By 1973, wide swaths of the city would be empty fields, the scorekeepers could
claim numerous successes. Gradually, new structures could be erected, and yet more
points could be scored. The papers were boosterish, offering a 50-year-long series of updates on the never-ending improvement of downtown and the city’s bright prospects. 	

Shortly after WWII, before downtown’s physical transformation, Buffalo had a
tax base of $10.25 billion.4 By 2013, the tax base was $6.4 billion, a decline of almost
40% in constant dollars5, and downtown streets were so desolate at midday that visiting
comedians could joke about it and get knowing laughs.6	

To someone aware that downtown Buffalo once had more department stores than
any mall yet built and when buses moved up Main Street in herds during the evening rush
(Fig. 1), picking up scores of people clotted on the sidewalks every five to seven minutes,
two questions come to mind: What happened to the “old” downtown, and why, after 50
years of revitalization projects and hundreds of millions of dollars in construction, is the
new downtown sleepier than ever? More office buildings, new high-rent apartment tow-
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Fig 1. Shelton Square, east side of Main St., 1950. Bankers did not appreciate what gave“Buffalo’s Piccadilly
Circus,” its vitality or its urban function. Source: David Bregger, Buffalo’s Historic Streetcars and Buses (Chicago: Arcadia Publishing, 2008).

ers, sports arenas, hotels, and convention centers have not led to a stimulating, inviting,
and useful downtown. The eradication of the small mixed-use building and the resultant
breaking up of commercial corridors is a significant factor in the quietude of downtown.7 	

A clean, quiet office park has its adherents, but it is a narrow constituency that
leaves the needs of others and society unmet. The goal was only to attract drivers, whose
mode of travel was cumbersome in traditional urban places of pedestrian efficiency and
density. Each new effort to accommodate the driver ran head-on into the terminal problem: a private car must be stored at the end of a trip, unlike a public streetcar or bus. This
storage, when it occurred off-street, necessarily meant less space for other uses. Buying
buildings and demolishing them for parking was expensive, so owners of the larger stores
advocated for public financing to acquire and demolish smaller buildings and businesses.
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Fig. 2, Buffalo c.1960. Change underway: Clearance of Ellicott Urban Renewal area (center right) almost done;
Thruway complete. Western New York Heritage (WNYH)

Every city property tax payer — those who owned a car and those who did not, small
business owner and homeowner—would pay to subsidize the large property owners and
the storage of automobiles. 	

Without the thousands of small businesses catering to every imaginable need, and
with the department stores opening branches in outlying areas, why would any driver go
out of the way to go to one downtown? And downtown was out of the way: geographical
circumstance dictated that Buffalo could not grow concentrically in all directions from its
point of origin, spreading in a rough circle across the landscape. Rather it was shaped like
a slice of pie, downtown being the tip. Promoting a centrifugal pattern of development
over the established centripetal one was especially reckless for Buffalo, and geographically doomed.	
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Chapter 1. 	


Grover Cleveland, Urban Man	

One can begin to understand what downtown Buffalo was once like by looking at
how a typical Buffalonian of the 19th century, or early 20th, might have lived his or her
life. In some respects Grover Cleveland—lawyer, sheriff, mayor, governor and President—may be seen as a typical urbanite, with the possible advantage of having a well
documented life. 	

Looking at the downtown of the American city (outside of a handful of mostly
large, mostly Eastern, cities), present-day observers might be wistful for the 1950’s, but
resigned to the fact that these are modern times, and the decline of downtown was inevitable, a victim of modern times —people liked suburban living, they liked cars, they
liked new houses. The decline was spontaneous, it just happened. Yet vital central cities
and towns and villages remain, sometimes in America, but predominant in other advanced economies with high rates of automobile ownership, suburbs, and new housing—
like western Europe, Great Britain, and Japan. The decline of the American downtown is,
in fact, anything but inevitable. It is a push-pull of subsidies for highway construction,
mortgages for new suburban houses, of private and public racial bias, disinvestment in
public transportation— a multiplicity of interacting factors. 8 These factors were at play
in Buffalo as well, its fate inseparable from the flood of federal money and enabling legislation beginning in the Depression.	

From the time Cleveland began his apprenticeship with the law firm of Rogers,
Bowen and Rogers in 1855, until he left the city to serve as governor of New York state
in 1882, he conducted the affairs of his daily life within a radius of four blocks of wher-
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ever his lodgings were. Cleveland began his apprenticeship living with a friend in a hotel
at Seneca and Michigan streets, and walked four blocks to the Rogers law offices in the
Spaulding Exchange, the city’s most important office building, at Main and Commercial
streets. 9 	

Later, as a law partner, sheriff of Erie County, and mayor of the city of Buffalo,
Cleveland never ventured far from his home. He hung out with friends at John Level’s
delivery stable near the Erie Canal, he socialized in saloons like Killian’s at 273 Washington, The Shades at Main and Swan streets; ate very often at Lewis Goetz’s, on Main
Street just north of Eagle Street, or at the Blue Moon saloon at 475 Main. As he became a
powerbroker in the city, Cleveland often could be found at a corner table in the Tifft
House, four blocks north of his law offices and apartment, or at a French restaurant at 325
Main. Cleveland even ran into his mistress (with whom he had a son) in a Main Street
department store. Maria Halpin boarded at 98 South Division Street, a stone’s throw from
Cleveland’s own domicile on Swan Street (Fig.3)	

An apocryphal tale in Dennis Lynch’s Grover Cleveland: A Man Foursquare, has
a contingent of Democratic party stalwarts setting out in October 1881 to find a candidate
to run against the entrenched Republican machine. The committee set out on a Saturday,
a work day, and headed for the Buffalo waterfront specifically. “Evening found the five in
the irregular triangle formed by the old Central Wharf on the harbor, and Main and
Commercial streets.”10 They had still not found their man when they walked up Commercial Street to Pearl and then followed Pearl for four blocks to Billy Granger’s saloon at
Eagle Street. It was there that Grover Cleveland walked in the door. The committee had
found its man, having made a loop of the most likely precincts in which to encounter a
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Fig. 3. Grover Cleveland’s neighborhood, 1880 (detail). On the eve of being elected mayor in 1881, Grover
Cleveland worked and lived in a mixed-use building, the Weed Block, at Swan and Pearl streets (red circle).
From his time as a legal apprentice in 1855, through a three-decade rise in Buffalo legal and political circles, culminating in his inauguration as Governor of New York in 1883, Cleveland never made his home in a
house, and never worked farther than five blocks from where he lived.
The Buffalo River runs along bottom of image, with Erie Canal terminus—the nexus of lake and canal
shipping entering lower center, between two grain elevator towers. Main Street runs from right lower corner to
left top. The city’s population in 1880 was 155,000.
Only two buildings in this view survive: St. Paul’s Episcopal Cathedral (immediately to north of circle) and
City & County Hall, now Old County Hall, left top). Library of Congress, Geography and Maps Division

Tielman 9
man popular and capable enough to be elected mayor, to say nothing of President.	

Cleveland and his cronies could just have well met three blocks further north,
along Genesee Street in the neighborhood of the largest public market the city ever had,
the Washington Market. From the 1850s through the 1950s, Genesee Street was second
only to Main Street as a corridor of commercial activity, and the Washington Market a
hive of small business and trade. Indeed, Genesee Street was more thickly developed until the 1920s than was Main Street north of Chippewa. A c. 1894 view of Genesee Street
from Main Street looking east shows three- and four-story buildings stretching as far as
the eye can see, the street defined by walls of brick (Fig 4). The classic arrangement was
commercial space on the first, and sometimes second story, with residential above. The
result was a teeming neighborhood. 	


Fig 4. Genesee Street east of Main, circa 1894. The streets that Grover Cleveland walked were defined by
buildings of classic urban dimensions: two to four stories high for the most part, with commercial establishments on the ground floor and residences, and perhaps specialized services or workshops, above. At street
level, the commercial space formed a continuous strip deep into the East Side, offering a new storefront, and
source of stimulation, every 25 feet. Edward Butler Library (EBL)
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Fig. 5 Genesee Street, the broad diagonal running from top to bottom in 1884 map, is solidly lined with buildings (north is on right), while Main Street, top, has large free-standing houses, while working class houses
east of Ellicott Street (the third street from the top) are smaller and closer together. Many are wooden.The
Washington Market is long, narrow building flanked by open plazas next to St. Michael’s church property
(shaded green).Buffalo and Erie County Public Library (BECPL)

An 1884 map shows how densely developed Genesee Street was. Main Street
north of its intersection with Genesee still has single-family houses (Fig 5). Genesee
Street, on the other hand, is built up on all sides, including, at a key intersection the great
Washington Market, historically Buffalo’s largest public market, with over 400 vendors at
its peak.11. The center of gravity for small businesses in Buffalo was clearly Genesee
Street.	

The Washington Market, built in 1856, was dominated by a 395-foot long Romanesque Revival central hall with an ornate cupola and decorative brick corbeling,
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Fig. 6 The Washington Market was the city’s largest public market, dominated by a architecturally impressive
market hall almost 400 feet long. This 19th century view is from the intersection of Genesee, Chippewa, and
Ellicott streets. EBL

flanked by roofed pavilions. Butchers and fishmongers were located in the central hall.
Farmers, hucksters, and prepared-food vendors arrayed themselves up and down Ellicott
and Washington streets in the flanking plazas (fig 6). Surrounding buildings housed larger
food merchants, apartments, services, and specialty retailers. Furniture retailers and
flower wholesalers clustered in the vicinity. The intersection of Genesee, Ellicott, and
Chippewa streets formed an exceptionally busy and colorful square, compelling enough
for postcard- and souvenir-book publishers to reproduce the scene12 (Figs. 7 A, B, C)	

Genesee Street had developed by Cleveland’s second Presidential term
(1893-1897) into a remarkable place. It was one of the first three streets in the city (the
others were Main and Niagara) to get public transport, in the form of horsecars (1861).13
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Fig. 7.Clockwise from above. (A)
A market square developed where
Genesee Street met the Washington Market. Detail of Sanborn
index map, 1880, BECPL. (B)
The square was busy and picturesque enough to merit a plate
in a souvenir book of the city in
1890. Author’s collection. (C)
Postcards also found the place
compelling, showing a bustling,
multi-faceted neighborhood in a
1911 view. In the distance on the
left is the dome of Buffalo Savings Bank; on the right is the
spire of the former Asbury
Methodist Church. (Postcard erroneously identifies Ellicott Street
as Washington Street). Corbis.
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It had frontage lined uninterruptedly with stores on either side and a trolley line (the system had been electrified between 1891 and 1895) moving down the center. Broad sidewalks served pedestrians, and the Washington Market was booming. 	

Unlike Main Street, which was home to Buffalo’s expansive department stores,
Genesee Street was the home of the small business, catering to neighborhood residents
and the middle- and working class from farther afield. 	

The three- and four-story commercial buildings on Genesee Street, (as well asBroadway, Eagle, and Seneca streets on the East Side) played important roles in both servicing neighborhood populations, as well as those passing through. This passing through
function occurred in part because of the attractiveness of such routes through downtown. 	

A decidedly unglamorous building, because of its location, could be quite attractive to passersby. For example, on the corner of Main and Genesee, is a mid-19th century
building (it still stands), that in the 1940s had a drugstore and a women’s furnishings
store on its ground floor, a beauty parlor on the second, and a furrier on the third. There
was a hierarchy of uses: high rent, high demand, on the first floor, a convenient location
for a regularly recurring service on the second floor, and a low-traffic, special occasion
retailer on the third floor. This is a hyper efficient environment for the pedestrian. (Fig 8)	

Just how closely packed all these services were, and just how efficient it could be
to be a pedestrian in downtown Buffalo through the 1950s, is apparent from analyzing the
Nirenstein Commercial Atlas, which mapped information on ground floor tenants, building owners, pedestrian traffic, and more. (Fig. 9)	

The Nirenstein maps are charts of pedestrian attractiveness. Environmental aesthetics take a back seat to usefulness and comfort. That begins with other human beings,
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Fig. 8. Typical small commercial building at the south east corner of Main and Genesee streets, c.1940. Tin
the Nirenstein Commercial Atlas of c. 1947, this corner was measured at 90% of the highest level of foot
traffic in Buffalo. Here were two ground-floor businesses which required high foot traffic and high visibility to
attract “walk-in” impulse buyers, with a beauty parlor on the second floor, which a convenient location for repeat customers, and, on the third floor, a furrier, strictly a low-volume, planned-trip destination retailer Highest
rents would have been on the ground floor, with rents decreasing with height above grade. WNYH

and by this measure, downtown Buffalo was attractive, indeed. Nirenstein found the most
attractive blocks to be on Main Street between Church Street and Genesee. The ability to
get multiple tasks accomplished over a short amount of time is evident in density of resources available. An office worker could run one errand and then set off on another in a
chain of events, or “trips,” (what geographers call trip chaining) and be back before the
boss knew he was missing. 	
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Fig. 9. Detail from Nirenstein’s Commercial Atlas c 1947. Roosevelt Square, with Main Street running horizontally and Genesee Street diagonally. Figures refer to pedestrian traffic categories, with 100 being the highest,
and other numbers expressing to the percentage of volume of the highest value location. Notations include
property owner and ground-floor tenant. Nirenstein counted 463 ground floor commercial tenants, including 14
department stores, in the core blocks of downtown Buffalo in 1947. There would have been hundreds more on
upper floors and, sometimes, in basements. Author’s collection.

That is why contiguity and concentration of varied land uses is important to an
urban place. It makes trip chaining possible and rewarding. People are propelled much
farther than they would otherwise go. Having widely separated destinations would be uncomfortable and inefficient, rendering the neighborhood not useful. Small businesses will
fail, and large ones will follow. The small commercial building was the habitat of the
small retailer, the small restaurateur, the small craftsman, and residents of modest means	
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The highly pedestrianized Buffalo of the pre-war era had what would seem, to
post-millenial observers, an astounding number of small shops sprinkled around the city.
During the Depression decade the city had just over 573,000 people. There were 2,172
grocery stores and delis alone (one for every 263 people), plus over 500 meat markets.
(Most were small Mom & Pop stores, but supermarkets were plentiful as well. There
were 92 A&P markets, for example. These were also smaller than supermarkets of the
present day). Not many of these shops could be called destinations, but they made daily
life easier for anyone who happened by, and often played central roles in their localized
civil society14	

Van Dyk’s Deli on Genesee between Elm and Oak Street was one of those places,
a small family-owned business that Grover Cleveland would have been utterly familiar
with. Van Dyk’s was on the sunny side of the street and served the residents and workers
of the immediate neighborhood. There were several other delis on Genesee Street within
a matter of blocks in each direction, and only a stones throw away were the hundreds of
stalls of the Washington Market. Stores like Van Dyk’s survived because it sold products
that had limited range and that people wanted to have right at hand. Bread, milk, eggs,
vegetables, soft drinks, beer, coffee, and tea. Items which one would need every day and
would seek at the most convenient outlet. Prices in delis were generally kept low by the
multiplicity of them in proximity and the occasional larger market several blocks away—
to say nothing of the Washington Market. (Fig. 10)	

Walking down Genesee Street on the block that contained Van Dyk’s Deli one
would come across cafés, a picture frame store, a radio repair outlet, a men’s clothing
store and many upper floor apartments. Moving toward downtown near the Chippewa
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Fig. 10. The Van Dyk Deli, 150 Genesee Street, between Elm & Oak streets, c. 1954 The small shopwas the
commercial and social backbone of its neighborhood. Thousands of such stores found a place in the pedestrian
city. Next door is the Genesee Picture Frame Company, the sole commercial survivor of over 500 businesses
once in the Elm-Oak Corridor and displaced by zoning and Urban-Renewal style road projects. Van Dyk’s, like
Genesee Picture Frame, was evicted in 1967. It did not relocate. The north side of Genesee between Elm and
Oak was demolished in 1969. Buffalo History Museum

Market, one would get insurance agents, general stores, banks, drugstores, and more.
These were all relatively small places, but these types of businesses draw much higher
patronage per square foot than any other urban land-use, dwarfing the traffic generated by
department stores.15	

A deli like Van Dyk’s can attract more than nine times the number of customers
per square foot than a department store. In addition, specialty boutiques such as the jeweler and haberdasher just down the street, could, on the prime shopping day of Saturday
attract over twice the number of shoppers per square foot than the department stores.16 	
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Fig 11. Genesee Street running diagonally Ellicott (top), Oak, and Elm (detail), circa 1965. North is to right.
Van Dyk’s Deli was in the 4-story building at northeast corner of Genesee and Oak; Genesee Picture Frame was
in contiguous white 3-story building. Despite 40 years of unfavorable zoning and mortgage financing, the block
contained 23 small businesses in 1965. Buffalo Office of Strategic Planning (BOSP)

Shops like Van Dyk could be resilient. Buildings like 150 Genesee could be resilient as well. The Buffalo of Grover Cleveland was resilient. Taking on its essential
form in the 1870’s, intensified by electric street cars, it made it into the first 60 years of
the automobile relatively well. In 1965, after the Ellicott Urban Renewal area upheaval
and the construction of the Kensington Expressway and the disappearance of the Washington Market, photographs and city directories still show virtually fully-occupied blocks
of buildings on Genesee Street between Michigan Avenue and Main Street. The buildings
are all three or four stories high the ground floor invariably housing a commercial business the upper floors residential or perhaps wholesale warehousing were manufacturing.
A typical mixed-use neighborhood of the mid-19th century and the mid-20th century. A
remarkable 23 businesses were on the block of Genesee between Oak and Elm, everything from a deli to a Chinese social club. Each of the buildings was there when Grover
Cleveland walked the streets. (Fig. 11)	
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If left alone, they might have had a fighting chance (one of them, Genesee Picture
Frame, survived even though it wasn’t left alone, moving in 1968 to a new location four
blocks away on Pearl Street near Chippewa). But there was only so much intentional and
unintentional destruction the city of Grover Cleveland could withstand.	

Flying over Buffalo in 1927, just after the city had adopted its first zoning code
(see chapter 4), one would have seen a city whose growth had slowed somewhat, both in
absolute terms and relative to the still expanding United States, but it was a city that
would have been the envy of most. Grover Cleveland, who died in 1908, would still have
been right at home. That year the Erie County Department of Highways undertook the
first aerial survey of the city of Buffalo and the Erie County. A photo mosaic of downtown Buffalo from that year shows a city in full. (Fig. 12)	

Near the lower edge, a black diagonal runs behind waterfront flatlands to The Terrace, beyond which the city rises. This black diagonal is the great Erie Canal, opened in
1825, but disused since 1918, when the terminus of the new State Barge Canal was upstream in Tonawanda. Great wharves along the Buffalo River and piers at Erie Basin still
bustled with 600-foot freighters that ran 1400-mile loops in the Great Lakes from Buffalo
to Duluth, Minnesota.	

A thick belt of railroad tracks and freight yards came in from the east, with passenger and freight terminals clustered near lower Main Street. The first railroad had appeared in Buffalo 1836, just 11 years after the canal opened. The railroad, to Niagara
Falls, ran from The Terrace. Its terminus in Buffalo was virtually on top of the the end of
the Erie Canal, Commercial Slip. From the very beginning it had been important for railroads to come as close as possible to the docks and wharves of waterfront cities the world
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Fig. 12. Downtown Buffalo, 1927 (detail). Last look at Buffalo before effects of 1926 zoning ordinance
makes impact. Concentration of large buildings can be seen for two blocks on either side of Main Street (top to
bottom, center), from Exchange (bottom) north to Genesee (uppermost diagonal)
A fine-grained city with primarily residential neighborhoods gradually transitioning into those that are primarily commercial and industrial ones. Intercity railroads and streetcar system intensified centripetal development. U.S. Census Bureau reports over 23,000,000 cars on road , (or 0.75 cars per household across the
country), but relatively little impact yet to be seen. Population of city approaching 570,000. University of
Buffalo Libraries (UBL)
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over. Other railroads came rapidly, and by 1853, the New York Central Railroad had
linked Buffalo with New York in one continuous railroad line. 	

Another railroad, the Delaware Lackawanna and Western, succeeded in getting to
the water, acquiring the entire stretch of river front from the Erie Basin on the west to
Main Street and beyond in the east. This signaled the triumph of railroad over the canal.
The railroads had wanted to reach the harbor that the canal had helped to make significant, but the canal itself, closed for half the year and left to carry only bulk commodities,
was no longer essential to the economy of Buffalo or the United States. 	

Buffalo’s geographic growth followed the dictates of nature and the logical direction platted by Joseph Ellicott in 1803: north and northeast. The principal spine was Main
Street, running north (paralleled by Delaware Avenue two blocks westward). Genesee
Street ran northeast, Broadway east northeast, and Seneca Street almost due east. Niagara
Street ran northwest. The buildings which sprang out like weeds from the ground around
the canal were by 1926 not at the center of Buffalo’s economic engine, but at the periphery. This was partly because growth could only occur in one quadrant of the compass:
away from the river and the lake. As the city grew northward and eastward, the Canal
District gradually lost its centrality for landslide activities. 	

The center of Buffalo economic and business life had for almost a century been a
brick building nearly a block-square in size called Spaulding’s Exchange. The Exchange
stood where The Terrace, Commercial, Exchange, and Main streets met. Bustling squares
came into prominence north of Spaulding’s Exchange, along Main. They were Shelton at
Niagara, Lafayette at Broadway, and Roosevelt at Genesee. From 1850 to 1950, the picture was of an almost uninterrupted mosaic of larger and smaller buildings stretching to
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the north and east and fine-grained residential neighborhoods stretching to the northwest
and northeast.	

This was traditional urbanism, based on muscle power, human and animal, intensified by steam and electric railroads. Railroads and streetcars had powerful centripital
effects on the new American cities. The means of transport, by delivering more pedestrians downtown, enhanced the existing land uses. The long-haul railroads met the short
haul street cars downtown, and created efficiencies for individuals and companies never
before possible. 17	

At the center was Main Street, which began at the Buffalo River and proceeded
northward, studded with busy squares where diagonal and orthogonal streets intersected
with Main (fig 13). The squares were nodes of the highest activity and land value, where
large office buildings, retail emporia, and public transit lines were built. Only after considerable distances from Main would one emerge from the solid masonry walls to an area

1

of freestanding houses. On streets like Genesee and Broadway, the commercial zones extended for miles. 	

In the quarter-century since the original zoning ordinance of 1926 not much had
changed spatially. Some scattered lots used to park cars have appeared, but the commercial corridors are intact. The picture of Buffalo in 1951 on the eve of its second zoning
ordinance was a landscape dense with buildings and crowded sidewalks, where one could
wander block upon block, past shop after shop, restaurant after restaurant, office building
after hotel, without apparent end. Buffalo was a beehive, where all of life’s necessities,
pleasures, and luxuries could be had within the square mile of its core. The Depression
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Fig.13. Oblique view of Main Street and downtown, 1924 from Buffalo & Niagara Frontier From the Air. Uninterrupted street fronts were the rule. A beehive of commercial and social activity, downtown was the central
place of an eight-county hinterland. Elm-Oak corridor is in upper right corner. BECPL

had brought a halt to most private construction, but wartime had brought full employment
to the city, which realized its peak census figure in 1950: 580,000. (Fig 14)	

In 1951, in addition to 14 department stores, there were over 473 occupied
ground-floor commercial spaces18 along an 8-block stretch of Main Street, Washington,
and Pearl in the 1947 Nirenstein’s commercial atlas19. Most of these were retail and
restaurants, ranging from shoe stores to an umbrella store. This tally does not include
commercial spaces above the ground floor (which were common), and the occasional
basement commercial space.20 	

Going northward into town in 1951, one sees a collection of tall buildings lining
the streets casting long shadows. Going roughly eastward was the Buffalo River. South of
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Fig. 14. Downtown Buffalo, 1951. A generation after Buffalo’s first zoning ordinance and just before its second. the Canal District had become a “zone of discard,” with the city demolishing the old Spaulding Exchange.
Housing of the old Canal District is virtually cleared for the soon-to-be-opened Marine Drive Apartments, a
state “slum clearance” project, lower left,. Large highway projects were getting underway, including the Buffalo Skyway, and planning for the New York State Thruway, which would appropriate the Lehigh Valley Railroad’s right-of-way (bottom). Erie County
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that was low-lying marshy land unsuitable for building houses and in the street. So Buffalo grew both north and east in concentric circles. As such the center of population and
access would naturally be on the line headed roughly northeast. Downtown Buffalo then,
from the earliest time of the city, was at the extreme southwest of the city’s—and county’s— main axis of growth. (Figure 15)	

That was not a problem when people walked or took horse cars or electric trolleys: the most efficient place to be would be downtown. It was the hub; the spokes were
Main, Niagara, Genesee, William, and Clinton streets, Delaware Avenue, Broadway, and
a smattering of others.	

Joseph Ellicott, unknowably designed the city to be the perfect realization of the
hub-and-spoke transit system, still the most practical way to move the most people most
conveniently at the least cost.21 Downtown had evolved to meet the demands for goods
and services that constituted daily life, as well as life’s special needs. 	

Residential neighborhoods began very close to the core the city on the West Side
along Niagara Street is a very dense neighborhood that came to be known as the Italian
Colony. It can be seen inthe fine-grained blocks filled with houses and trees on the lefthand side (Fig. 14). On the lower right, one sees a similar close-grained neighborhood:
The Lower East Side, in 1951 the home of Buffalo’s African American community, as
well as Jews from central Europe and, in the Swan and Seneca Street corridor along the
railroad tracks, Italians. In the 19th century it had been home to Germans. 	

Above the Lower East Side and ranging to the northeast was a broad sweep of
working class neighborhoods populated in the 19th century largely by Germans, both the
Genesee Street corridor and, to its north, the Fruit Belt (Cherry, Orange, Lemon, Mulber-
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1 dot=1 person
2010 Census. Adapted
from Census Dotmap,
bmander.com

Fig 15. The geographical dilemma of downtown Buffalo. Buffalo’s European settlers established themselves on
Lake Erie where Little Buffalo Creek met Big Buffalo Creek. Expansion to south and west was preempted by
swampy land, broad waters, and a national frontier. Consequently, founding surveyor Joseph Ellicott laid out
major streets to run into flatlands in northeast quadrant (red arrows) of a circle with its center on Main Street
at harbor. The center of population of the Buffalo area has followed the blue arrow.
In era of fixed-path public transportation (like streetcars) it was easiest for spreading population to still
carry on affairs of daily life downtown; the transportation system acted with centripetal force. The advent of
the automobile brought a change in public attitudes toward who should pay for specialized infrastructure. Formerly, public transportation was financed privately; in era of the private automobile, costs were socialized.
Large public investments in highways exacerbated centrifugal force inherent in flexible-path transportation.
The reactive programs to suburbanize downtown robbed it of its urban distinctiveness, rendering it an out-ofthe-way node in a suburban system.
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ry, Grape and other streets ran through it). In addition, there were several hundred mixeduse buildings in downtown with apartments on the upper floors. Townhouses could be
found just a block off of Main Street on North Division Street (where they remained until
demolished in the 1960’s). Freestanding Second Empire-style houses from the 1870’s
could be found Franklin Street, just north of Court Street, in the shadow of the Walbridge
Building (One, housing a raffish roast-beef-and-beer joint called Ace’s Steak Pit, survived
until it was demolished for the Buffalo Convention Center in 1978).	

Genesee Street, Broadway, and Seneca Street, as can be seen by the shadow lines
visible on the streets, were lined by three- and four-story mixed-use buildings from
downtown outward for miles. The most salient thing about this photograph is the interconnectedness of the residential neighborhoods with downtown. It was possible to walk
—be propelled— down the streets from one’s house to the central business district,
whether one was going to work or merely running errands. 	

There were useful things, necessary things, and occasionally delightful things
every step of the way. These had located themselves and evolved to be responsive to the
nature of the pedestrians passing by. It was a good urban life. It was good because spatial
quality was good, and spatial quality was good. What were the physical and psychological parameters of pedestrians? What spatial behaviors was the city so good at addressing?	


!
!
!
!
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Chapter 2	


Components of Spatial Quality in the Urban Context	

The downtown Buffalo of 1951 was densely packed with stores and services
which made the necessary tasks of work and householding efficient and stimulating, resulting in a large number of optional and social activities. The urban planner Jan Gehl has
rendered this graphically to show the relationship between a high-quality physical environment and a low-quality one, in which quality is a measure of comfort and usefulness
to a pedestrian, rather than an aesthetic judgement22 (Fig. 16)	

Using a Gehlian approach, one can evaluate the changes in the downtown Buffalo’s spa-

physical
environment
high quality

physical
environment
low quality
necessary
activities

optionall
activitiest

social
activities

tial quality over time. In 1951, downtown Buffalo had a physical environment conducive to economically and socially rewarding interaction. Its
spatial quality was good.	


Fig. 16. Spatial Quality matrix. Necessary
activities not effected by quality of environment; optional and social activities can be
greatly increased through better urban quality. Gehl, Cities for People (Washington:
Island Press, 2010)

Whether downtown Buffalo has a good
or poor physical environment has little effect on necessary activities. Going to court on a
given day or going to work, the physical environment has little affect. That activity of
getting there will occur regardless. Optional activities, on the other hand, are greatly affected by the quality the physical environment. Are other people on the streets? Is it
pleasant to be there? Do I feel safe? Affirmative answers to these questions all add up to a
good physical environment. If this good physical environment exists with a large range of
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optional activities, people invariably bump into each other, meet face-to-face, discuss
things, create new ideas. This is a necessary function of urban development. Further, social activities increase greatly with a good physical environment.23	

Downtown in 1951 after a half-century of the automobile showed little spatial reordering. Scattered lots where buildings formerly stood were being used to store cars, and
there are a few small private parking garages occupying mid-block lots. On the west is a
harbinger of a spatial transformation: a short section of the New York State Thruway has
been built on the bed of the former Erie Canal, terminating at the foot of Church Street. A
network of railroad tracks still exists, but the largest passenger station is gone: the New
York Central station on Exchange Street. The New York Central moved to a new station,
Central Terminal, a mile and a half to the east, in 1929. The “landfront,” where blocks of
tall buildings fronted the tracks remained.	

By 1981, the highway and clearance programs planned in the 1950’s had brought
profound changes in the land and drastically reduced the spatial quality of downtown.
Succeeding decades have not reversed the trend. Today, Buffalo has a low-quality environment;24 projects on the drawing board will continue to erode downtown’s spatial quality and its ability to regain its sidewalk dynamism.	

There are human and geographic factors that have a bearing on the “lively street”
scenario described in the chapter 1. Such a scene requires a certain number of people to
meet the threshold that a given place of business needs to succeed. The denser the surrounding area is with people, the more exchanges can occur, and the greater the chance of
success. Large cities with millions of people close at hand are much more efficient at ex-
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change than the same people would be in an area the size of North Dakota. Proximity
alone produces economic benefits, which in turn provides economic opportunity.25	

Erie County, within which Buffalo lies, had essentially the same population in
2010 as it had in 1950 (despite the sprawling real estate development outside the city’s
bounds in that time). Buffalo’s population has declined by 50% over the last 60 years.26
Its population density, then, has declined by 50%—even more downtown (by design, as
we shall see). In addition, downtown has lost the physical character, again through policy,
that could foster a dynamic street life. Up until the early 1960’s, the entire point of nonindustrial building construction downtown was to be attractive to pedestrians; after that,
attractiveness to pedestrians (in the practical and stimulatory sense, not aesthetically) was
subsumed by the practical needs of drivers (a car at rest and in motion requires exponentially more space than a person). It is now common in downtown Buffalo for entire
blocks to be taken up by parking and for office buildings to exclude inviting street-front
commercial space. As a consequence, there are few places people can naturally and comfortably gather. The rest is “dead zone.”	

To get an understanding of what a dead zone is and what causes it to be lifeless, it
is necessary to understand the geographical concept of the friction of space (or distance),
and how environmental characteristics effect it.	

At its most basic, the friction of space refers to the effort or cost needed to overcome the space between objects. Reducing the friction of space at any scale confers advantage and reward. For example, almost from the beginning of television, there has been
demand for a remote control.27 The remote control enables the user to change channels
without the effort of rising from the couch and walking to the television set. Just as the
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Erie Canal reduced the friction of space
between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Seaboard, the television remote
reduced the friction of space between
couch and television. Sheer distance is
only one aspect of space that causes
friction. An uphill slope, a wall, perceived danger, slippery pavement, deep
snow, high temperatures, darkness,
mode of conveyance, types of pathways,

Fig. 17. The rewards of reducing the friction of space.
Even small improvements in spatial quality can pay big
dividends. Here, a pizzeria opens a window directly onto
the sidewalk, exposing passersby to its sights, sounds,
and smells, and maximizes convenience for customers.
Author

and the physical capability to overcome them are just a few other possible factors.	

Human beings will seek the path of least resistance to bridge the space between
themselves and an object, and also consider the intrinsic value of the object. What effort
would one expend to get a cup of coffee? To visit a friend? To save 50 cents on a box of
cereal? To save $1000 on the purchase of a car? We are speaking of the range of a good.
The range of a cup of coffee is very low: it is not unusual in large cities to find a coffee
chain placing two stores on opposite sides of the same street. In 1947, three Fanny
Farmer chocolate stores were spaced at three-block intervals on a stretch of Main Street,
always on a corner. This indicates a high level of foot traffic, the low range of a piece of
chocolate, and the short distances people will walk.28 A slice of pizza or a cup of coffee
have similarly low ranges (Fig. 17).	

Why do road construction projects, residential demolitions, and the removal of
commercial space blocks off of Main Street affect commercial space on Main Street? It
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has to do with the necessity in retail for having contiguous development. Contiguous,
dense, mixed-use development is a precondition for lively sidewalks. Having lively sidewalks is not only an interesting and useful for many urban dwellers, it is an engine of
economic development.29 The destruction of small commercial buildings, by disrupting
the contiguity of public attraction (what is a storefront window but a public invitation?)
quickly increased the friction of space in downtown Buffalo. When the costs of walking
come to outweigh the potential benefits, people are less like to make the trip. 	

The farther the trip, the more costly it is in terms of effort. The average
length of a pedestrian trip drops off drastically with distance.30 The most active
walkers in the United States are those in
Manhattan. There, 50% of walking trips
are over 1250 feet. —two, perhaps three
city blocks. In a city like Buffalo (Edmonton is Pushkarev & Zupan’s closest approximation), less than 20% of trips are
over 1250 feet; the 50% threshold of

Fig 18. The farther the distance, the fewer the trips.
Distance decay for pedestrian trips in Manhattan and
Edmonton. Of the two, Edmonton, where 40% of
pedestrian trips are 500 feet or more, is most like
Buffalo. In Manhattan, almost 90% of trips are more
than 500 feet, 40% are greater than 1500 feet.

walking trips in Buffalo is under 500 feet.
This is not to say that during a lunch hour or running errands, an individual would only
consider a stop within 500 feet of a starting point, but that to go farther, he or she would
need a compelling reason to tack on another “trip” to the overall journey. When several
discrete trips are incorporated in a journey, geographers speak of “trip chaining.” Trip
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chaining is what animates a commercial district. This is why discontinuities in commercial frontage are often fatal to maintaining pedestrian traffic. Shopping mall owners and
designers of fairs and festivals know this well.	

Gehl, the Danish architect and researcher, developed an index for what constitutes
a lively street. It is a simple friction-based formula: The number of doors per 100 meters.
The more doorways on a stretch of sidewalk, the more stimulation and utility that section
of a city can offer. Others researchers have confirmed and expanded upon these measurements, allowing for the development of indices for spatial quality. 31 Consider these
with Gehl’s matrix for urban quality, and one can begin to map past and existing conditions and predict future ones.	

Expanding our discussion of the friction of space from the city block to the city
region reveals a specialized role for the traditional downtown. Settlements owe their existence to geographic factors. Is there a waterway nearby? Is the soil nearby fertile? Is it at
the junction of railroads or highways? Is it cheap to get raw materials assembled in the
place and manufacture goods and ship them out again? All of these things factor into
whether a place becomes a mere hamlet in an agricultural area or a large megalopolis
with global reach.	

Cities towns and villages have spheres of influence or an economic hinterland. A
farmer in need of seeds, tools, or conviviality needs these things close at hand. Geographers would say that a bag of seeds and a cup of coffee have a low threshold of distance;
that is, a person will not travel far for them. Therefore, places to buy seeds or a cup of
coffee tend to be numerous and placed close to the consumer. Many people need seeds or
coffee. Hamlets have a number of houses and smaller businesses based on a small market
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area and sell products, goods, and services required on a daily basis by most people. Other services and products less frequently used, such is legal advice, medical services, or
automobile purchases, find themselves in larger communities with larger hinterlands. A
hierarchy of villages, towns, and cities is therefore established, with the larger cities having very specialized services that are only possible with a large population base. Advertising agencies, television stations, and manufacturers of diagnostic equipment are few and
will be clustered in larger cities. The range of medical diagnostic equipment dealers can
be vast, as can the range of a TV station.	

Johann von Thunen, a German 19th-century economic geographer, first posited
the idea every city had a hinterland, with land use determined by the cost of overcoming
distance to a city or central place. Thus, all other things being equal, the city would be at
the center of a series of rings defined by predominant kinds of development. William
Cronin’s Nature’s Metropolis is essentially a explanation of von Thunen’s Theory of
Rings as applied to Chicago, which developed a hinterland of continental scale. Whether
a market for lumber, beef, pork, or capital, Chicago’s influence came to shape much of
the landscape between Michigan and the Rocky Mountains. 	

Buffalo owes its existence as a city to a reduction of the friction of space between
the Great Lakes region and the Atlantic seaboard. The mechanism was the Erie Canal. It
reduced travel time of freight between the Hudson River and the Great Lakes by weeks
compared to overland travel. It reduced by 97% of theoretical cost of shipping a given
item between Buffalo and New York City.32 	

The ramifications were broad. It became possible for the British Parliament to repeal the price supports of Corn Laws with the knowledge of cheap transport of American
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grain from the Midwest.33 An American farmer in Ohio or Indiana could grow wheat,
harvest it, mill it into flour, ship it on Lake Erie, have it transferred onto a canal boat in
Buffalo, bring it to New York harbor, transfer it onto an oceangoing vessel, deliver it to
Liverpool, transfer it to a canal boat, brought to a baker in a Midlands city, and baked into
bread and put on the breakfast table of an English laborer cheaper than English farmer
could do it. In this scenario, farmland in Ohio was part of the hinterland of Buffalo and
Buffalo was part of the hinterland of Liverpool. 	

With the Erie Canal, Buffalo had a unique cost advantage. That advantage eroded
as railroads arrived on the scene, collapsing the friction of space further, but doing so for
a wide variety of cities and towns, and not necessarily those on waterways. New York and
Chicago were the cities that gained full advantage as continental rail termini.	

Moving from the city region back to the city neighborhood, one can use the Ring
Theory to explain geographic phenomena like the micro-geography of neighborhoods.
Reducing the friction of space operates on many scales. In the Erie Canal example, it is
on a global scale with waterborne shipping. Air travel has another scale. Jet travel is convenient for distances of over 400 miles; but becomes less so the shorter the distance, due
to the time and effort of going back and forth to airports and the time spent in terminals.
Considering the portal-to-portal time, for trips like the 90 miles between New York and
Philadelphia, it is more efficient to take the train or drive, while walking might be the
most efficient way to travel between Penn Station and 14th Street in New York. A geographer would call this active transport.	

In actively transporting oneself from Penn Station to 14th St., a pedestrian is exposed to any number of retail stores, commercial enterprises, people on the sidewalk, un-
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folding of events, and opportunities to get a drink of water or sustenance. It is this activity
that is the highest and most essential form of reduction of friction of space in the metropolis. The efficiency of the micro environments of the core of a city or town is a predictor of the success of that town. This is one reason lively sidewalks are important to a
city. 	

The center of a given geographic area is what real estate professionals commonly
referred to the “100% corner.” This was the place with the highest pedestrian traffic
count, and, theoretically, the highest locational value. Every other spot within that city
could have its pedestrian traffic and value expressed as a percentage of the busiest place.
As distance from the busiest corner increases, pedestrian traffic decreases. This is a result
of the friction of space, or distance decay. The 100% corner is the highest efficiency location in a traditional urban setting. Demand and rents are then highest. 34 Those who cannot afford the rent are forced to locate farther from the area of peak activity. This can be
represented as a mountain peak where real estate values, building heights, and pedestrians
are greatest at the center and taper off gradually on all sides until a level plane is reached. 	

Nathan Nirenstein, in the introduction to his commercial atlas, wrote: 	

The value of real estate lies in location, not area. A city block is often worth
more than a whole rural county. Density of population as evidenced by traffic
passing a corner determines the rental value of a location. Density of crowds, similarly intensifies American selling power. “Nirenstein’s Atlas” lists properties
where crowds pass and where cash flows fastest, locations that leading operators
in real estate vie with each other to own, rent or mortgage. Main Street is a tight
little island whose golden boundaries are least likely to change. The centrally located site has a stability of value usually well assured by population growth.35	


!
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Fig. 19. Main Street, July 1947, looking north from Lafayette Square to Genesee Street (Genesee Building
center top). The west side of Main Street from Eagle (one block south of Lafayette Square) to Genesee was the
“100% location” for Buffalo foot traffic. Fanny Farmer Candies, which required high traffic locations for its
impulse items, had three stores on Main Street, including the one above middle right. Bregger

In urbanist Jan Gehl’s scale of street activity,36. someone walking an average
speed in Nathan Nirenstein’s Buffalo (220 feet per minute) would pass a new store every
6 or 7 seconds. That sort of stimulation attracts and propels people. Gehl’s scale of the
frequency of doorways implies that what is between the doorways is of interest, whether
it be merchandise, people enjoying a meal, an architectural detail. That was certainly the
case in downtown Buffalo through the early 1960’s. 	

Then, with the first large coordinated public-private redevelopment project, the
characteristics of new construction changed. Just as controlled-access highways were be-
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ing planned, controlled access buildings, with doorways—if any— hundreds of feet apart,
became the norm. Buffalo was building drivable suburban sites within the downtown
core. 	

Gone were continuous streets of shops and restaurants, apartment buildings, and
offices, all with doors leading directly onto the sidewalk. They were replaced by long
stretches of street lined with impenetrable walls: office buildings with wraparound walls
and plazas, shopping malls with a focus on the interior rather than on the street, convention centers built for the purpose of bringing people together that instead deadened the
streets around them. 	

If Buffalo had tried to create dead zones it could hardly have done better than go
down the path it chose. It went down that path boldly, big plans in hand.	


!
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CHAPTER 3 	


Make No Little Plans	

From 1957 to 1977, the changes in the land of downtown Buffalo were profound
and the connections between downtown and the east side of the city severed. Buffalo embraced federal and state programs that paid to clear “vacant and blighted” buildings, the
definition of which was left to the cities themselves. Buffalo also pursued state and federal highway highway projects as a source for construction and demolition jobs. It was seen
as particularly enlightened if the city could use highway construction programs and parking ramp construction to meet the goals of clearance. Buffalo had no shortage of enlightened bureaucrats, politicians, architects, and businesspeople. They set to work on the east
side, west side, waterfront, just about all around the town.	

In the process, the the central place functions of, successively, The Terrace, Shelton Square, Lafayette Square, and Roosevelt Square—the knots in the Main Street cord—
were destroyed. With them, they destroyed the central place function of downtown itself.	

There was a concerted effort in Buffalo after World War II to isolate downtown
Buffalo’s business core from surrounding residential and mixed-use areas of the Lower
East Side, Lower West Side, and lower Main Street. The proxy of population density and
the evils supposedly thereby attending—poverty, disease, blight—was used to promote
“slum clearance” programs. (Fig. 20). The city planning department had a presentation
slide made in 1955 of a map which showed “high density” places, which coincided with
the neighborhoods it wanted to develop by expropriating the land, consolidating it into
large parcels, and selling it to large developers. The story it attempts to tell, the idea it
wanted to sell, was fraudulent. Not only were some of Buffalo’s densest neighborhoods
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its richest (the apartment towers of Delaware Avenue), but the land that the city
wanted for the Thruway Industrial Park was
almost empty of people, and included a
large rail yard and the Niagara Frontier
Food Terminal, the city’s wholesale food
market. The industrial park was eventually
moved across William Street, an area that
historically had more cows and swine than
people: the stockyards. 	

This scraping away of neighborhoods surrounding downtown’s core exacerbated the geographic disadvantages of
downtown, creating a peninsular effect, with
the cleared areas and highways acting as a
moat. The nature of this spatial barrier and
how the city of Buffalo sought to fill it, or
not, strongly influenced the quality of urban
space. This gets to the very nature of human

Fig 20. Policy, rationalized. Map prepared by the
Buffalo Department of Public Works purporting to
show highest population densities in city as justification for demolition (1955). The easternmost bloc
was centered on a rail yard that was sought for an
industrial park and had few people; similarly a section projecting south of Exchange Street and west
of Louisiana had a very low population density. The
city wanted the land for industrial parks to be serviced by the coming Thruway. Other areas were
Italian-and African-Americans neighborhoods.
BOSP

settlements and cities and their purpose as
places for people to meet and exchange goods, ideas, and to socialize. Spatial barriers are
as consequential as physical barriers, and when they make it difficult for people to meet
face-to-face, it is difficult for crucial interactions to take place.	
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These face-to-face interactions have been, since Lewis Mumford’s The City in
History and Jane Jacobs’s Death and Life of Great American Cities, advanced as the
proper goal of urban design. Mumford was advocating against the ill effects of the automobile on the traditional city, and Jacobs was attempting to save the traditional city by
pointing out its strengths vis-a-vis highway construction and post-war urban development
and zoning. Recently, scholars outside of geography have developed models which
demonstrate that the number of face-to-face interactions on the city street is a direct consequence of urban density.37 When density is lessened and barriers created, local
economies suffer.	

Department store owners and managers were among the leaders in pushing proposals which they felt would benefit them. In 1975, after a 15-year frenzy of demolition,
downtown still had eight department stores and scores of specialty shops. AM&A, Sattler’s, Woolworth, Wm. Hengerer, Hens & Kelly, Neisner’s, W. T. Grant, and L.L. Berger,
but hundreds of small commercial buildings had been destroyed, and the remaining ones
weakened, and the ties with the surrounding neighborhoods had been severed. As the vicissitudes of department store retailing claimed one chain or independent after another,
the massive downtown department stores closed Racism was also evident, as can be
gleaned from newspaper articles about the increasing percentage of African Americans in
the shopping district and attitudes toward them.38 New generations formed new habits,
and as people with the downtown habit grew old and died, so did the stores. AM&A was
the last full-line store to close, in 1994 (Woolworth, next door and much smaller and
more downscale, closed in 1997). L.L. Berger closed in 1991; Hengerer in 1987; Hens
and Kelly, 1982; Sattler’s, 1982; Grant’s in 1976.39 (all had opened suburban branches,
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and W.T. Grant and Woolworth were national chains that failed). The suburban mall sites
of all the closed stores were occupied by other department store chains. Interestingly,
none of the suburban freestanding store sites were taken on by other chains—“anchor”
stores apparently need small stores more than small stores need them. The downtown
buildings were converted to other uses, demolished, or partially occupied by retail).	

The department store leaders of Buffalo and others like them felt that they were
being left behind by postwar growth in the suburbs. Plazas serving new suburban developments in Tonawanda, Amherst, and Cheektowaga had sprung up, and the branch department store was born. By their nature these were patronized by people driving cars,
siphoning off what formally would have been customers of the flagship department stores
downtown. The corporations owning the department stores did not suffer overall; it was
the smaller independent and chain stores downtown would have been the first to feel a
dropoff in foot traffic. 	

In the history of the Buffalo department store, 100% of metropolitan and economic growth had redounded to the only place where department stores were: downtown.
When branches opened in outlying areas, it was natural that downtown would have a decreasing share of overall sales. The large department store operators were feeling that
downtown was losing its preeminence. In 1959, they commissioned a report from business consultants Arthur D. Little to analyze what was happening and to make recommendations. It was released in late 1960 to great fanfare40 Department store head Robert
Adam led the committee that commissioned the report, which largely echoed what Adam
already believed.	
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The Little firm interviewed business leaders (many noted that the clientele on the
street was subtly changing. The relative poverty of those living in proximity to downtown
was noted as well), and recommended what the owners and bankers already had stated
they wanted: a sweeping reconstruction of the retail core.41 Given the gloss of “scientific”
study, the business establishment endorsed the plan. 	

The Little plan certainly had the power to stir certain mens’ blood. The head of
the Buffalo branch of the American Institute of Architects, Milton Millstein, wrote in Buffalo Business, the magazine of the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce, 	

“Our planning should indulge the driver habit as ingeniously and attractively as
our planning skills will permit…The ease and speed with which shoppers can avail
themselves [of the goods, services, and facilities of downtown] will be an important
factor in the renascence of our downtown. So let us not discourage our potential driver market. Let us, instead, pamper it with the most direct and convenient access it
can have to its destination and provide for a system of economical or even free parking, if possible.”42 Seldom has one man been so wrong about so much. Milstein went
on to praise the “concrete ribbons” of the new highways girdling downtown that “often lift the observer above the squalor of slums and carry him swiftly by it.” Presumably, as well, they carried him by the remaining small businesses not themselves
cleared for the highways.43	


!

Milstein and others were ignorant of the concept of trip chaining, and even lacking the intuition that trip-chaining by car is radically different than trip chaining on foot.
Single-purpose, brief trips are inefficient in a car over short distances. Linking a number
of these together in a chain, even in a suburban environment, is more difficult still. Cheap
or free parking militated against having a space available at any given time at a given
place,44 while timed-fee parking put a limit on duration for “park-once” pedestrian tripchaining and opportunistic lingering. Timed-fee parking tends to winnow drivers to single-purpose, single-site trips. The parking cost, not hidden as it is in a mall, tends to be
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added to the cost of purchases by the driver, making a downtown store seem less competitive where price is a factor. This led, in Buffalo, to the larger stores short-sightedly driving parking policy to the detriment of smaller ones, many of which were demolished for
parking. This made downtown as a whole less attractive and efficient for everyone, and
undermined the department stores themselves in the end. Public transit users have no
such time constraints or automobile storage problems. Buffalo made no attempt to pander
to them.	

It is remarkable that, in an early 1960’s, a downtown pedestrian traffic study that
sought to count shoppers and may have been produced because of the Little study, the
highest number of pedestrians on the east side of Main Street was near the intersection of
Eagle St. and the highest number of pedestrians on the west side of Main Street was at
Mohawk Street. 45 The demolition of all the stores on Eagle Street between Pearl and
Washington was recommended by the Little report (save for AM&A, of course), as was
the closure of Eagle and Niagara streets between Main and Pearl to accommodate an underground parking ramp for Main Place Mall .46 East Eagle Street was terminated at Ellicott Street to form an automobile-efficient “superblock” between Clinton and North Division. As for Mohawk Street, it was eliminated between Pearl and Franklin (as was Genesee Street) for the Buffalo Convention Center in 1977. Thus the two highest volume corners for pedestrians traffic, and the stores, buildings, and routes that made them that way,
were destroyed. (Fig. 21) 	

The closing of Mohawk and Genesee streets had the effect of dramatically decreasing pedestrian traffic from the west, affecting the viability not only of retail stores,
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Fig. 21. The consequences of ignorance: The highest foot traffic count on the west side of Main Street in the
early 1960’s was at Mohawk Street; on the west side it was at Eagle Street. Both were destroyed by subsequent projects. Here, the closing of Genesee and Mohawk streets in 1977 for Convention Center added hundreds of feet to trips between Niagara Square and Main Street between Huron and Mohawk. Long frontages
with little or no public access also reduced pedestrian traffic. Fewer people made it to Main to run errands or
eat lunch, leading to closers of stores and restaurants. Buffalo Preservation Report, Spring 1999.

but even the fast food juggernauts of McDonald’s and Burger King, which had both located pioneering urban outlets at Mohawk and Main.	

Buffalo’s retail policy was reckless, done to imitate suburban forms without examining or understanding urban strengths. The consequences have been dire. The traditional functions of a central place—shopping, eating, socializing, meeting people and
coming up with ideas —have vanished from downtown Buffalo.	


!
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Big Holes in the Landscape	

Perhaps the area that had caused initial concern for Buffalo business leaders was
lower Main Street. The Canal District, with its salty character and low-rent accommodations (common to ports the world over, had been a target of improvement campaigns
since at least the 1890’s.47 Erie Canal traffic had been declining for decades in favor of
the railroads, and building rents could not meet ordinary maintenance. A bitter irony was
unfolding for downtown after the Depression and war: the railroads were so successful by
the 1910’s that they were finding it difficult to handle all the traffic they had in the confines of the downtown trackage and expensive real estate. The New York Central was
leading the effort to plan for a new central passenger and freight complex elsewhere.	

The New York Central had been on Exchange Street since it arrived in Buffalo in
1836. Other railroads soon followed, some building their own stations for freight and
passengers, others renting from the Central. A rail-based ecosystem of hotels (including
the mammoth Hotel Buffalo, which was the foundation of Ellsworth Statler’s industryshaping hotel chain), restaurants, shops and warehouses grew up around the stations and
melded with Shelton Square. Grover Cleveland, as has been noted, lived in a boarding
house in the neighborhood.48 Train passengers made Ellsworth Statler’s 500-seat restaurant in the basement of Ellicott Square a success, and Statler opened his mammoth and
innovative Hotel Buffalo across the street at Swan and Washington in 1907.	

The Depression kicked off a little early in the lower Main Street area. The New
York Central and six other railroads moved their passenger operations to the new Central
Terminal in June 1929. Overnight, 200 daily trainloads of passengers no longer stopped
at Exchange Street.49 Through the 1930’s the neighborhood across the street from the old
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Fig. 22. McLeod’s Hotel & Restaurant (c.1930), was on Exchange Street at Wells, opposite the main station
of the New York Central Railroad. The railroad moved to the new Central Terminal in July 1929, and in October
of that year the stock market crashed. The building held on until 1958, when it was demolished for the New
York State Thruway’s Elm Street ramp. WNYH

station suffered from the double “whammy” of the relocation of its biggest source of traffic and the effects of the Depression. Many of the hotels, restaurants, stores, and warehouses were just hanging on, with little money for maintenance. 	

By the 1950’s, the buildings of lower Main struck many as shabby. Businessmen
promoted schemes to demolish them to “clean up” the area. 50 As a bonus, large parking
lots could be created. This aesthetic bias toward order and cleanliness in the decisionmaking classes—without awareness of urban function—was a strong force for legitimizing the public taking of lands for highways, parking, and renewal projects.51	
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Fig. 23 The Heywood Wakefield furniture building c. 1930. Its demolition, with over 50 other buildings, for the
New York State Thruway ramps to Elm and Oak streets, occurred in 1958. WNYH

Mewling about unkempt buildings and streets was old hat; dreaming about big
civic projects went back to The City Beautiful movement of the early 20th century. What
was new was the vast river of federal and state cash that was pooling below the surface in
the form of Depression-era housing legislation. 52 That reservoir was augmented in 1956
by the National Defense Highway Act, which authorized the Interstate Highway system.
Everyone knew bulldozers were coming. The questions would be where to send them and
how to maximize the opportunity they represented.	

The area around the old railroad mecca of Exchange Street was ripe. The New
York State Thruway would come into downtown along the old Erie Canal bed on the west
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side and run to the east along the Lehigh Valley and New York Central railroad rights-ofway. An interchange was needed, and Elm and Oak streets were to be the feeders to the
ramps. The ramps originally began at Seneca Street (they were to be extended to Swan
Street 20 years later). Elm and Oak Streets did not extend south of Swan Street, however.
The intervening buildings, four blocks’ worth, would have to go. These included the former Macleod’s Hotel, a prototypical small commercial building(Fig. 22), and the mammoth and architecturally elegant Heywood Wakefield building (Fig. 23) , a furniture factory and wholesale store that was later the Erie County Welfare Building). Demolition
began in 1958.	

It was the first taste of large-scale demolition of downtown buildings Buffalo
would have (the Ellicott Urban Renewal Area demolitions were commencing concurrently on the other side of Michigan Avenue and the Kensington Expressway demolitions
were making their way to Mulberry Street in the Fruit Belt). The scale was perturbing to
the demolition contractor, Nelson Reiman. “Fifty-five large buildings will have to come
down,” Reiman told the Buffalo Evening News. “That will mean some sizable properties
removed from the tax rolls and some big holes in the landscape.”53 Those holes were only
the beginning. (Fig. 24)	

The city’s zoning ordinance was creating a path of least resistance for demolitions
to come.	


!
!
!
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Fig. 24. Seneca Street and demolition in the lower Main area for New York State Thruway ramps, c. 1959. The
first wide-scale demolition downtown. Over 50 major buildings were destroyed, breaking the contiguity of the
Seneca Street commercial strip. The Waterfront Urban Renewal area was designed to extend to the ramps from
the west, and the Elm-Oak project from the north, claiming several hundred more buildings. Many remaining
buildings, their value as commercial space severely weakened, were demolished by private owners and became
parking lots or empty fields. BOSP

	


!
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Chapter 4	


Zoning Out: The Institutionalization of Residential and

!

Commercial Decline in the Elm-Oak Corridor	


The first step to systematically separate downtown from “undesirable” neighborhoods was embedded in the city’s first zoning ordinance, passed in 1926. (The country’s
first zoning law was New York’s of 1916, conceived to control the construction of skyscrapers and noxious land uses. Once WWI was over, Buffalo bureaucrats, politicians,
architects, and businessmen started thinking of an ordinance for Buffalo, and started
thinking big.) The Buffalo Common Council in 1919 established a City Planning Committee composed of department heads.54 “Experts” were hired to review and sketch plans
at its behest. The first task was for a grand civic center in the City Beautiful mode. Several proposals focused on clearing out blocks of the near East Side for the civic center cum
beautification project (Fig. 25). There was a generalized feeling that the neighborhood
was a problem.55 It was densely populated and relatively poor. It was also home to Buffalo’s most visible minority, African Americans56, in addition to Jews along William
Street57 and Italians along Swan Street. 	

Here you could have a “twofer,” promote a civic improvement while getting rid of
a blight. Architects, with the social sciences in their infancy and urban studies a thing of
the distant future, were both given and assumed a new portfolio, that of urban design. 	

It was Daniel Burnham’s fault. Burnham, of Chicago, was designer of the Great
White City of the Chicago world’s fair of 1893 and, on the strength of that, author of a
Plan for Chicago in 1909 that envisioned clearing out block upon block of messy urban-
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ism for an imperial civic order. His
oath “Make no little plans; they have
no magic to stir men’s blood…” is
almost part of the mass American
lexicon. Most references never get
beyond that first clause. The great
come-on for American architects
and tyro urban planners was the second sentence: “…a noble, logical
diagram once recorded will never
die, but long after we are gone will
be a living thing, asserting itself
with ever growing insistency.”58	

Just how insistent is evident
from the first zoning ordinance. It
codified the thinking that the East

Fig 25. Submission to City Planning Commission for a CityBeautiful-style civic center (1919) would have required demolishing 13 blocks centered along Oak Street. Much of this
area was zoned M1 in the city’s first zoning ordinance, enacted in 1926. BOSP

Side should be kept at a distance
from the commercial core. An industrial zone was carved into the corridor between
downtown and the East Side, centered along Oak street (Fig. 26). Three blocks wide at its
narrowest, it stretched from Genesee Street in the north all the way down to Exchange
Street. It was the only M1 (light manufacturing) zone in the city not on a rail line or navigable waterway (the former New York Central station’s tracks were inaccessible from
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Exchange Street). It was the only manufacturing zone that was not already characterized
by belching smokestacks and clamoring heavy machinery or other noxious use. 	

It also had a wide variety of buildings that house uses similar to that of other
downtown blocks. Houses, churches, warehousing, schools, and small manufacturers.
Many people lived there, in apartments and free-standing houses. Things were about to
get a lot harder for building owners and their residential tenants in that corridor.	


!
Zoning maps are signaling devices. A municipality conveys in the maps its intentions for financial and political capital. The M1 designation cleaving the near East Side
from downtown meant no municipal investment in support of housing or commercial
space and benign neglect, at best, for owners of dwellings and commercial buildings. The
city would have been saying “we don’t want you there.” As the zoning law went into effect, owners of dwellings that were not contiguous with other such properties would have
found it hard to get mortgages, loans for improvements, or to use the properties for collateral.59 The homes were now officially in an undesirable residential location, one that
only promised to get more so. The value of a given piece of property for residential uses
declined by design. Owners of residential properties would find demand for their units
declining, leading to lower rents and less money for repairs and improvements in an endless downward spiral. With bad enough conditions, people would move out entirely.	

That is indeed what happened. In 1933, city land-use records show 522 dwellings
in the Elm-Oak corridor. In 1950, at the city’s population peak, U.S. census enumerators
could confirm only about 350 units occupied in a somewhat broader area defined by census tracts.60 After a quarter-century of the M1 zoning designation, the housing stock was
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Fig.26. Buffalo’s 1926 zoning ordinance included an anomalous extension of a manufacturing district into an
area—the Elm-Oak corridor—which had no railroad access and was mixed-use, with hundreds of residential
and commercial spaces (left, outlined in blue. Author’s collection). This served devalue residential and commercial uses and to split the lower East Side from downtown. This zoning has persisted to the present day
(right. BOSP)
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declining and people were not moving in (the M1 finger was three blocks wide, from Ellicott Street to the rear lot lines of Michigan Avenue, and the residential strain that was
felt between Elm and Oak would have extended to Ellicott and Michigan as well). Many
units did not have central heating or hot water, improvements which owners across the
city were making to their dwellings;61 the investment in the Elm-Oak corridor, if money
could be had, would not be worth it. So improvements were not made. “Planner’s blight”
had begun in the Elm-Oak corridor. 	

Beginning in the 1890’s there had been civic organizations advocating demolition
of “insanitary and slum” properties in the area along the Erie Canal. The Depression
brought efforts by New York State and the city to demolish deteriorated housing. Possibly
the only reported opposition to the demolitions was that of a group of artists who thought
that the areas of the waterfront and downtown should be saved for housing and to save
the character of the city itself. The artists, reported the Courier-Express, “fear a civic cyclone of cleanliness may sweep away interesting reminders of Buffalo’s past and batter
down buildings which give it a distinctive stamp…” Part of the future Elm-Oak and
Church Street Extension corridors was singled out as worthy of preservation by the artists
in 1939: “On North and South Division streets and in the lower West Side…are many fine
old houses of good architecture…”62	

Just as residents of the near East Side were being zoned out, so too, were commercial uses. Commercial tenants would have been weakened from the population decline and from the even greater likely decline in foot traffic. A successful business would
have found it hard to expand if doing so conflicted with the notion that the city might
want the land in the future. In 1949, the city planning commission rejected a business ex-
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pansion on Clinton Street nearby,“after the commission’s planning director, Dale Bossert,
pointed out the district has been proposed as a possible site for redevelopment slum
clearance.” The National Housing Act of 1949, creating the urban renewal program, had
just been passed. In the meantime, the city was not only barring improvements, but freezing investments in upkeep, encouraging deterioration, until such time as the bulldozers
came (that would be another eight years for the Ellicott District property in question). The
city planning commission chairman, Welles B. Moot, emphasized “that in the event that
area is approved for redevelopment, it will be far less costly for the city to acquire if there
are no permanent structures on the land.”63	

The zoning ordinance of 1926 and its successor of 1953,64 were the foundation on
which sweeping Urban Renewal and highway plans were conceived. The first of these
was the Ellicott District Urban Renewal Plan. The last was the Elm-Oak Corridor road
project. A sword had hung over the corridor since the maps of the first zoning ordinance
were drawn in the 1920’s. The people and businesses of the neighborhood would have to
endure 50 years of limbo before the sword came down.	

The aesthetic bias of Buffalo’s opinion- and decision-making classes evident in
the City Beautiful proposals of the 1920‘s and planning reports of the 1930’s,65 was compounded by its racial and class biases.66 Further, to be poor and working class and African
American, Jewish, or Italian was to be living on the lower East and West sides, and the
waterfront. In other words, aesthetic, racial, and class biases could be attached to location. Real estate is all about location. Observing Buffalo through the prism of real estate
values, without understanding— or even awareness—of underlying social, spatial, and
economic interdependency in an urban environment, one begins to see different states of
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Fig 27. Ellicott Urban Renewal Area, c.1964. Announced in the early 1950’s, wholesale demolition began in
1959. Over 5,000 people lost their homes. The site lay fallow until 1966. BOSP

being as a threat to one’s own. Buffalo’s downtown retailers, bankers, and newspaper
publishers saw threats on all sides in the 1950’s, and, with the new federal and state programs, they could do something about it.	


!
Urban Renewal and highway plans effected the small commercial building of
downtown Buffalo in two direct ways. The first was the physical destruction of buildings,
the second the reduction of the customer base that supports high ground-floor commercial
rents. In turn, the customer base can be effected by alteration of traffic patterns, spatial
barriers, and physical elimination of nearby housing. During the 1950’s, the Buffalo
Planning Department created a presentation slide equating population density with undesirable conditions.67. The stated goal was to lower density, on the theory that that would
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solve a myriad of social and economic problems. That meant eliminating housing units.
The approved method was to clear an entire neighborhood of buildings, good and bad.	

The first neighborhood targeted was the lower East Side. The Ellicott Urban Renewal project, approved in late 1957, by itself destroyed the living quarters of over 5,000
people. Only 220 units of new housing were constructed, the first of which were ready in
196668 (Fig. 27). This set in motion a rolling catastrophe. The population of the lower
East Side went from nearly 89,000 in 1950 to 65,000 in 1960 and, when the dust had
mostly settled, 24,000 in 1980—
a loss of 65,000 people in one
neighborhood in a 30-year
span.69 These are people who
could have walked or taken a
short bus ride downtown to
work, shop, or be entertained.
They were also those whose
proximity would have made
downtown their first choice for
all of those activities.	

What happened on the
East Side was shortly to be repeated on the West Side. Thousands of people were forced out
of their homes and hundreds of

Fig. 28. The Old Italian Colony, part of the Waterfront Urban Renewal Area. Top, the area before demolition; bottom, after demolition, c. 1969. Piers for Virgina-Carolina Expressway can be seen
under construction. BOSP
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businesses were forced to close because of the Waterfront Urban Renewal project, which
targeted the Italian Colony.70 These people, too, were customers, owners, and employees
of downtown stores. The Waterfront project was a fiasco. (Fig 28). Hundreds of houses
owned by working - and middle class Italians were expropriated and demolished. Home
ownership rates went to zero, as the cleared land—42 acres—was sold to the New York
State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) after no other takers could be found (for
$331, 550 — about $100 for every person who lost their home)71. The UDC constructed a
Brutalist complex of apartments meant to “compete with the suburbs” and eventually sold
it to a corporation that agreed to maintain the project as low-income housing. 72	

The notion that demolishing entire neighborhoods was the best way to combat
blight, whatever its cause, was often pursued outside of the Urban Renewal programs,
most often with highway projects. In Buffalo, a cordon of highways was conceived as a
cordon sanitaire protecting downtown from the surrounding city. The Kensington Expressway sliced through the East Side, while the Virginia-Carolina expressway was
stopped at Niagara Street. The Elm-Oak Expressway failed entirely, but not the idea that
the entire Elm-Oak corridor should be demolished anyway. 	


!
!
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Chapter 5	


Urban Renewal by Other Means: A Belt of Highways	

While planning for the Kensington and New York State Thruway were underway,
so too was an idea to connect them to form a belt of expressways around downtown; one
along a north-south corridor formed by Elm and Oak streets, another along an eastsouthwest path described by Goodell, Edward, and Virginia streets, the Virginia-Carolina
Expressway, informally called the West Side Arterial. The idea of an enhanced roadway
belt for automobiles had been around as early as the 1920’s, but the expressway proposals
of the post-war era were different in kind—high-speed, controlled access highways that
would require separation from the surrounding city. 	

Planner’s blight was everywhere evident on the lower West Side by 1965, during
the property condemnation and acquisition phase of the Viginia-Carolina project. Resident and landlord Vito Russo stood at Georgia and Efner streets and encapsulated the
problem for reporter Joe Ritz. He “waved his hand at a row of abandoned houses.
‘Smashed windows. Boards falling down. Nobody spending any money on these places.
Nobody’s paying any taxes. Nobody wants to buy any property.’” Ritz continued that
Russo “received a notice years ago that the state would take his properties for the Virginia–Carolina Expressway. He hasn’t heard anything from the state in recent years.”73 	

Again, drawing lines on maps for renewal areas and highway corridors had a chill
on investment, and the condemnation and demolition process, which took many years in
each neighborhood, cast a pall over the entire city. It did not even give residents affordable housing. Another West side resident, retiree Charles Maranco, complained “How am
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Fig. 29. Part of the Viginia-Carolina Expressway got built.This was to connect with the Kensington Expressway
on the East Side (1971). Expressway construction was halted at Niagara Street, but continues to serve as on/
off ramps for Niagara Section of New York State Thruway (top). EBL

I going to get $80 a month for rent? I get $87 a month benefits.” He and his wife were
renting a two-bedroom apartment on Efner Street for $35 a month.74	

Few writers, working in an environment in which their publishers were part of the
boosterish, unquestioning chorus backing highways and Urban Renewal, raised issues
that would question the demolitions all around downtown, which peaked in 1967 and
1968. In addition to Ritz at The Courier-Express, Dick Baldwin, contributing an article to
the July number of Buffalo, the magazine of the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce, managed to get published such an article months after a photo feature in the same magazine
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slobbered over proposals for new buildings. 75 Baldwin tried to convey the scope of the
unfolding changes., “…face-lifting takes time.,”	

In the interim, Buffalonians are learning to live with the noise of the heavy
wrecking machinery, the dirt, the rubble, the scarred landscape and the occasional
fires in vacant buildings awaiting demolition.	

The demolition is making room for officially - designated urban renewal
projects, for highway construction projects and for a privately financed downtown
redevelopment effort. Some is aimed simply at getting rid of dilapidated buildings.	

With buildings tumbling down in all directions it is difficult to compile precise
statistics about them. Hundreds of buildings are involved, however, and their destruction is removing millions of dollars of assessed value from the city tax rolls.
The loss in assessments is expected to be offset by some of the new construction
planned for downtown and other areas…	

Many of the most moving emotions, however, were evident during the demolition of row upon row of modest homes along such streets as Carolina, Georgia,
Fourth, Efner, Trenton, Seventh, and Busti Avenue. Tears were shed, too, when
the corner stores, the neighborhood taverns, and the other small businesses fell
under the wreckers’ ball. These were the places where memories lingered. For
many families, these modest neighborhoods were the only homes they had known
in Buffalo.	

It is anyone’s guess how long it will take for construction to begin on the
promised apartments, commercial and public buildings, roads, parks and other
improvements. If the history of the Ellicott Redevelopment Project and the
Thruway Industrial Park Pilot Project are any indication of what is to come, it
may be a long wait.	


!

The Virginia-Carolina Expressway was envisioned in some form since at least the
1920’s, was part of the City Planning Commission’s General Plan of 1950, and partially
built in the late 1960’s as the Italian Colony was being demolished. It appeared in city
master plans up to 1972. 	

Just as an Urban Renewal proposal could cause planner’s blight, so could condemnation threats for a highway. In this case, citizens were able to gather enough politi-
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cal strength to stop the project, but not before the New York State had put owners on notice that they could be ordered to vacate with 30-days’ notice. As this had a direct effect
on property values and rents, it was a required part of any private sale or rental contract.
Predictably, building owners would not spend any money on maintenance. The contract
stipulations continued long after the expressway was politically killed. In the 1990’s, a
historic Main Street building that lay in the path of the project was demolished because of
irreversible deterioration linked to the project. 	

About the only thing more damaging to a neighborhood than a plan for a highway
was the actual construction of a highway. The Ellicott Urban Renewal project set off a
chain reaction of rapid neighborhood decline. Thousands of poor African Americans were
forced to move, but, unlike their Italian and Jewish neighbors, were racially discriminated
against and could, as a practical matter, move mostly northward, into the Masten District
and the Fruitbelt, areas that were in the path of the planned Kensington Expressway.
White working class residents who could began to move out in droves. 76	

Plans for the Kensington Expressway were published in 1953 by the New York
State Department of Public Works; it followed a route laid out in the city’s General Plan
of 195077 it would begin at on Cherry Street at Michigan Avenue and cut through the East
Side to Humboldt Parkway, where it would use the right-of-way of Frederick Law Olmsted’s grandest parkway on its way to the Thruway and airport. Property condemnation began in the late 1950‘s, and construction completed in 1962. This coincided with the demolition of 1,200 buildings four blocks south in the Ellicott Urban Renewal Area. The
first section completed was between Michigan Avenue and Best Street, just one block
north of Genesee Street. The East Side went into upheaval. Anyone who could get out,
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did get out—the longer one stayed, the greater the chance one’s housing value would fall,
making less money available for new quarters elsewhere. 78	

The Kensington Expressway had devastating effects on the commercial vitality of
the mile of Genesee Street stretching eastward from Maine to High Street. It did this in
two ways. First, slicing through the east side a short block north of Genesee Street, the
Expressway cut off Fruit Belt residents, some 5,000 people, from the merchants who
served them. Further, the commuter automobile traffic which went by the shops twice a
day was largely eliminated.	

So catastrophic and obvious was out-migration that the Common Council took the
extraordinary step of conducting a special census in 1966. It found that the city was losing almost 10,000 people a year, much of it from the Ellicott District. In response, the
Council adapted a scheme of weighted voting until the 1970 census.79 Those Ellicott District residents left behind, then, lost political power as well. 	

Add to this the planner’s blight occurring because of the city’s application to the
federal government for total clearance of the Italian Colony; the opening of the Niagara
Section of the Thruway, which severely weakened the commercial corridors of Seneca
and Niagara streets; and the plans for connecting the Kensington to the Thruway via the
Elm-Oak corridor and the Virginia-Carolina-Goodell corridor, and one begins to understand the panic among newspaper publishers and downtown retailers. In their panic, they
offered a solution: more of the same, and faster.	

The Buffalo Evening News and The Courier-Express were beside themselves, stridently inveighing against the slow pace of the clearance programs. The assumptions of
the programs went unquestioned (not that certain writers did not try to get subtle critiques
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Fig. 30. Kensington Expressway plan, 1953. Planning and construction of the expressway destabilized a broad
section of the East Side at the same time the nearby Ellicott Urban Renewal Area was announced. The Fruit
Belt neighborhood (top) was cut off from its main shopping and entertainment area, Genesee Street (running
parallel to expressway on the south). Fruit Belt was rendered a less convenient and attractive place to live,
while Genesee street lost half of its neighborhood pedestrian traffic and almost all of its commuter automobile
traffic. BECPL

past editors). Mostly, it was panic and panygerics—panic over deteriorating conditions
they did not understand, panygerics over bold new plans to stem the decline. 	

In 1964, the Courier, in a front-page, boxed feature in a Sunday edition, launched
a series on blight under the banner “Action Needed to Halt City Decay” with an editor’s
note that spoke of “the leprosy of deteriorating neighborhoods which appears to be
spreading unchecked throughout the City of Buffalo.”80	

Five years later, the Courier was on the warpath again. Writer Douglas Turner,
soon to be promoted to editor of the paper, teamed up with another reporter to expose
the perceived slow pace of demolition in the Waterfront Urban Renewal Area and the
Elm-Oak corridor. To illustrate the story, a photographer instructed to take pictures of
weed-covered, rubble-strewn wastes. “The objective,” the photographer was instructed,
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Fig. 31.. Kensington Expressway terminus,1971. Fruit Belt on right. Cleared area was to be interchange with
Elm-Oak and Viginia-Carolina expressways. EBL

“is to show demolition and leveling projects...is [sic] not being accomplished...much of
this has been untouched for weeks… [G]et shots in each area showing how crummy the
situation is.” 81 It remained a crummy situation for another 44 years, until a tax-exempt
hospital corporation began construction of an office building on the site in 2013. (Fig. 32)	

Indefatigable, the Courier in 1973 reiterated in the page-one story “Why Blight
in Buffalo?,” that the only thing wrong with urban renewal was the speed at which it oc-
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curred. Planners’ blight in the Waterfront Urban Renewal Area and the Ellicott and ElmOak projects finally was exposited, but only as an avoidable consequence of lack of expedience. Plans that involve uprooting thousands of human beings from their homes
come with complications.	

The construction of the Kensington Expressway on the East Side and the VirginiaCarolina interchange were recounted: there had long been plans to link the two with an
expressway, which was being reevaluated due to the concerns of residents in its path: 	

The uncertainty of such a situation is that the residents of the West Side stretch between those two streets have let their property...go to pot. Who wants to put money
into a place the state may take over before the property improvement mortgage is paid
off assuming you can get such a mortgage in the first place?82 	


!

Public policy had caused the economic death of the buildings. They were dead
buildings standing. Zombies.	

The Courier noted that the state had announced in 1962 that plans for the ElmOak project were “well underway,” yet it wasn’t until 1967 that the state began demolition of structures in the corridor. In 1973, when the article was written, the paper was
concerned that “what hasn’t been torn down is continuing to deteriorate.”83 	

You cannot please everyone. Analyzing aerial photographs taken the same year
that show sweeping destruction surrounding downtown—thousands of buildings on
dozens of blocks, most of it occurring since 1966—one wonders how much faster the
work could have taken place. Yet editors and writers of the largest-circulation Sunday
newspaper in the state north of New York City wanted more. Buffalo’s policymakers
(politicians and business leaders) and planners, having made zombies of the mixed-use
buildings of Elm-Oak through zoning in the 1920’s and extending the zombiefication to
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Fig 32. Two blocks of Elm-Oak corridor north of Genesee Street demolished in 1969 (top, EBL). Within
weeks, Courier-Express sent a photographer out with express instructions to come back with pictures showing
how “crummy the situation [was].” The photo had the effect of showing the row of buildings on the south side
of Genesee Street as being blighted and suitable for demolition without delay.. The rest of the Elm-Oak corridor
was demolished over the next decade, but the site that peeved the Courier in 1969 was to be vacant for over
40 years (bottom, author).
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all other buildings with the highway plans of the 1950’s and 1960’s, it was put to government to end the zombie threat, and fast. 	

Just as zoning had put a chill in residential investment in Elm-Oak, talk of clearing the path for an expressway would extend the chill to all types of buildings. Thus, 20
years after the 1926 zoning, Elm-Oak was put in a deeper kind of limbo. Existing small
businesses were put on borrowed time, and new businesses were discouraged. By 1962,
with the Kensington Expressway finally opened, the connecting expressway plans moved
forward. The Buffalo Division of Planning released a plan that November that sought
money from New York State for the “Elm-Oak Expressway”. The New York State Department of Transportation agreed to undertake planning for the roadway. 	

Urban Renewal boosters and highway advocates in Buffalo and across the nationhad targeted neighborhoods inhabited by those judged politically powerless. As time went
on, and people could see the costs and consequences outside their doors and across the
nation, they learned the political ropes. Between 1962 and 1967, however, popular resistance to the highway projects was building. Neighborhood residents experienced the effects of destruction and dislocation first hand, and they were fighting back 84	

The city decided not to build a below-grade Elm-Oak Expressway. City and state
officials agreed that, even though no additional land would now be required for the ElmOak Expressway (existing rights-of-way of Elm and Oak streets would be used instead),
the state would continue to condemn and demolish a block-wide strip of buildings from
the Kensington to extended Thruway ramps at Swan Street. It would then hand over the
cleared land to the city for free.85 In 1976 the plan for an arterial corridor was finally re-
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leased, and by 1979 construction was underway at both ends, although acquisition and
demolition of a handful of buildings in between remained (Fig. .33) 	

The justification for the project was bad pavement on both Elm and Oak streets,
and the crowns of intersecting streets, which created a bumpy ride, slowing traffic, and
the unbalanced daily traffic flow which caused backups at the north and south termini.
The objectives were to provide “an acceptable level of service during peak hours” and to
“minimize delay in the Elm-Oak Corridor by use of an effective intersection control system.” The result was a paired system of four-lane, one-way roadways that encouraged
people to speed, with all cross traffic –pedestrians, cars, trucks, and busses—being rendered inefficient by the blockade of roaring traffic and long waits to cross.	

The character of the traffic on Elm and Oak changed to high-volume and high
speed. That would be enough of a discouragement to pedestrians or even cars who ventured to cross it from the East Side, but the north-south highway traffic was given precedence by traffic signaling: two-thirds of the time, it was given the green light, while people traveling to and from downtown on Genesee, Sycamore, Broadway, North Division,
South Division, and Swan were given the red light for two-thirds of the time.86	

After 60 years of being targeted for clearance in 1919, zoned to discourage residential and commercial development in 1926, targeted for a highway corridor after
WWII, on the receiving end of Kensington Expressway traffic in 1962, the Elm-Oak Corridor clearance was finally accomplished.	

Here was a case of Urban Renewal by other means. Elm-Oak was transformed
into a no-man’s land. Hundreds of commercial ground-floor spaces were removed from
the city core, as were perhaps 1200 people. A spatial barrier, a glacis, had been built be-
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Fig. 33. The Elm-Oak Corridor demolition progress, 1979. Almost the entire lower Main area between
Michaigan Avenue (right) and Washington Street (left) has been destroyed, while few structures remain standing between Elma and Oak streets north to the Kensington Expressway (top). The lower East Side is totally cut
off from downtown. EBL

tween downtown and the East Side. All the contiguous commercial street frontage of
Genesee, Broadway, Eagle, and Seneca streets was destroyed. All the housing and all the
wholesale and retail shops that connected downtown with the East Side were gone. The
commercial buildings east of Elm Street and west of Oak Street were hobbled by the end
of activity on the adjacent sidewalks (Fig, 34). There were expanses of open land everywhere, some camouflaged as parking lots. None of it, consolidated into large lots, could
have been afforded by a homeowner or small business. 	
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Fig. 34. The Elm-Oak corridor, from complex urban corridor to dead zone.

In any case, smallholders—Mom and Pop— were institutionally unacceptable:
Philosophically, why peddle the land to the class of people you just took it from? Administratively, why —a local, state, or federal agency would think— deal with 30 smallholders on a block if we could deal with just one large entity? Bureaucratically, each agency
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involved in a given piece of property would have its own vetting process to determine the
“project”-worthiness of an applicant proposing to acquire a piece of land, a process which
included a great deal of paperwork and disclosure that would require a staff to complete
(Even 40 years later, the city’s “Request For Proposal” —RFP— process seems designed
to discourage all but the biggest local developers).87 Financially, the creditworthiness of
applicants as determined by banks and government institutions obviously favored corporations with long and disciplined credit histories.88 Lastly, it would be naive to think political relationships were absent in the calculus of property redistribution. 	

The lines of large private corporations that urban renewal promoters had imagined
would form to snap up the “shovel-ready” property did not materialize. In the Waterfront
Urban Renewal Area and the Elm-Oak Corridor, there are many properties still owned by
the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency and other public entities a full 50 years after acquisition began.89 It turned out the old buildings and small lots were not the impediments to
‑

“progress” or newness they were singled out to be.
Focused on inducing automobile traffic and eliminating housing stock and old, smallcommercial buildings, Buffalo leaders failed to see what their actions would do to foot
traffic or the central place function of retail and wholesale trade. In removing so much,
they had removed the reason to go downtown in the first place. In 30 years’ time, downtown was transformed from a traditional (and romantic, if Buffalo’s artists were right)
urban center into a just another node in a suburbanized system of retail; one that was on
the periphery of the new automobile-based system, not in its center. 	

Not only were the connections between downtown and the neighborhoods lost,
the contiguity of commercial spaces within downtown was lost, as new subsidized office
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buildings eliminated retail and commercial space and replaced it with
blank walls and other functionally
dead spaces.90 The buildings constructed on the Elm-Oak Corridor are
remarkable in their antisocial aspects
hundreds of feet of like walls line Oak
and Elm streets. (Fig 35)	

Assuming good intentions, the
purpose of these postwar undertakings
was to create revitalize downtown, to
bring more foot traffic and retail viability. What was built to replace the
small commercial building, under
public auspices, if not direct public
sponsorship, ensured the downward spiral of downtown as the commercial and
marketplace would continue.	

Each of the office projects
which were conceived to occupy
cleared land would be designed as a
drivable destination, which reduced
the urban efficiency and spatial quality

Fig 35. New buildings on Oak Street, deadening on arrival.
Single-story, single-use buildings with hundreds of feet of
blank walls define the term “dead zone.” Doors facing public rights-of-way warn that there is “no entry, emergency
exit only.” Above, corner of Genesee and Oak, 2012. Author
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of downtown. Policy, abetted by
political expediency, had sought to
make the downtown office infrastructure as close to that on offer
in the suburbs. The ironic result was
that the regional office market followed the retail market— shorn of
its spatial advantages and distinctiveness, downtown became, again,
just another (out-of-the-way) node
in a sprawled-out region of office
parks.	

Traveling across New York
State, one sees similar landscapes in
the central areas of cities large and
small. The wide areas of cleared
land, the straightened and widened

Fig 36. Urban dead zone. View north on Main at Exchange St.
Top, 1977 (Paul Redding), bottom, Google Street View,
2012. Small commercial buildings with active street fronts
were replaced by walled bank compound straddling Main St.

roads, the modernist local headquarters building of former Marine Midland Bank, the
plentiful parking adjacent to somnolent sidewalks, the failed or failing in-town enclosed
shopping mall. Niagara Falls, Lockport, Batavia, Rochester, Auburn, Utica, Little Falls,
Elmira, Binghamton, Newburgh. All of these cities and dozens more had Urban Renewal
agencies (or parking authorities, which carried out similar tasks). These agencies were
established under New York State law, from which all municipal powers must come, so
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that the host municipalities could qualify for the millions of dollars distributed by federal
and state highway and Urban Renewal programs.	

What kind of law could have been written that would have had such sweeping effects on the urban fabric yet prove so bureaucratically resistant against change until the
job was done?	


!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 6 	


The enabling state: New York’s Urban Renewal free-for-all	

In New York State, urban renewal proponents were given almost unlimited scope
in selecting buildings and neighborhoods to be demolished. These powers, necessary if
cities were to avail themselves of federal funds, had to be specifically granted to municipalities by the state. This was done in section 501 of the General Municipal Code. Besides being explicitly enabled to redevelop a community through “clearence, replanning,
reconstruction, rehabilitation, and concentrated code enforcement,” municipalities were
given power to conduct “relocation activities and the testing and reporting of methods
and techniques for the arrest, prevention and elimination of slums and blight.”91 	

The powers granted municipalities were extensive, including the provision for	

demolition and clearance of property, improvement of property, or development
and use of air rights and concomitant easements or other rights of user necessary for
the use and development of such air rights and other rights, including the remedying
of unsuitable topographical, subsoil or other physical conditions which impede development…, and construction of foundations and platforms as well as other necessary
site work.” A municipality then, could not only condemn properties and demolish
them, but also pay for improvements to the site up to and including the building foundations.92	


!

In other words, a municipality could undertake a one-off project that did not otherwise comply with the urban renewal legislation, provided the project were defined as a
test of methods. A city could conduct a series of demonstration projects, each of which
could start with the clearance of a city block or an entire neighborhood, and it each could
stop there, without consequence. In the meantime, credit could be taken for removing a
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“blight,” contracts for demolition could be sprinkled about, and the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency could pocket up to 20% of the state grant for administering the acquisition,
demolition, and site preparation. It was only required to file a report. 	

New York State hereby enabled its municipalities to comply with Title One of the
federal 1949 Housing Act and Section 314 of Title Three of the Housing Act of 1954.
Further, the municipality’s urban renewal plan did not have to be consistent with state or
federal objectives, only with the objectives of the municipality itself, leaving municipalities to develop and carry out plans in a consequence-free environment.	

In its justification for granting sweeping powers to municipalities to alter their
landscapes, the New York State General Municipal Law, paragraph 501, avers that 	

…there exists in many municipalities within this state residential, nonresidential,
commercial, industrial or vacant areas… Which are slum or blighted, or which are
becoming slum or blighted areas because of substandard, insanitary, deteriorated or
deteriorating conditions, factors, and characteristics, with or without tangible physical
blight.” 	


!

Again, it is merely up to the applicant to state that, even in absence of tangible
physical blight, an area could be eligible for the cornucopia of state and federal programs
leading to clearance of entire neighborhoods. Free money to demolish “slums”? Where
do we sign up?	

This made possible perhaps one of the most egregious demolition sprees in Buffalo history: the creation of the Church Street Extension Mall (Fig. 32), wherein four city
blocks of often imposing buildings —and, in the bargain, Shelton Square, which disappears from the local nomenclature at this time—were destroyed for the aesthetic benefit
of two local banks. M&T Bank president George Newbury, whose bank had already an-
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Fig 32 Shelton Square, “disappeared.” Top, The buildings on the east side of Main Street between North-and
South Division Street defined the former Shelton Square, 1911, and demolished, bottom (published in Buffalo
magazine to demonstrate progress on the “new” downtown). Four blocks of commercial buildings and houses
were destroyed for a landscaped median for a 10-lane arterial, splitting the downtown core in half.

nounced plans to demolish an entire block of stores between Eagle and North Division
streets for a new headquarters , said “I would strongly suggest that the entire block on the
east side of Main Street between North and South Division streets be cleared out.”93 It
was. At a stroke, two blocks of retail frontage, containing the busiest point in all of downtown, was replaced by 677 feet of dead space, including a new 10-lane divided roadway
and the raised and walled-off bank plaza.	
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Chapter 7 	


Mapping the Changes in the Land	

The urban spatial quality of downtown Buffalo declined drastically as a direct
consequence of plans conceived and carried out by Buffalo’s downtown business and political leaders. Most of the demolition came in a cataclysmic period from 1958 to 1973 or
so, but it is a process which continues in less dramatic ways to the present day. Government-supported revitalization schemes still focus on architecturally fashionable corporate
compounds and destination attractions, formulas which have failed Buffalo before. The
city’s urban fabric continues to erode, creating a great emptiness which is best appreciated on Sunday mornings, when all office workers and partiers are home and the parking
lots empty (Fig 38). There is an abundance of vacant space.	

The maps on the following pages, consisting of aerial photographs from 1951 and
2011 overlaid with graphics indicating street frontages with enough commercial space to
be deemed potentially active (50% or more of the linear feet of a given block given over
to retail, restaurant, or services was considered active, whether or not the space was actually occupied). The 1951 graphic, if anything, understates the vitality of the areas which
are shown to be commercially inactive—the blocks are solidly built-up, either in houses
or apartments, or small warehouses, wholesalers, and industrial lofts. The character of
those buildings was much different than the single-story, blank-walled buildings with
fenced-in parking which characterize the red-demarcated blocks in the 2011 map.	


!
!
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Fig. 38. The great emptiness, downtown Buffalo, top, 1973 and, bottom, 2011. Upper photograph shows
Marine Midland tower occupying two blocks of lower Main Street with a walled compound just north of the NY
State Thruway. It was part of Waterfront Urban Renewal Area, arcing from left to right along bottom. Elm-Oak
corridor demolitions about 60% complete. Downtown has become isolated peninsula. National Archives and
Records Administration. Bottom, parking lots and single-story buildings dominate eastern edge of downtown.
Bing Maps.
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Fig.1 39. Map 1. In 1951 downtown Buffalo’s commercial street frontage was near or at its peak. Green lines
Dead Zones, 1951
indicate a side of a street that had 50% or more of its length occupied by ground floor commercial space. Red
lines indicate a side of the street with less than 50% commercial frontage. This is a rough measure of the potential for urban vitality: people on the streets. Main Street between Eagle and Genesee was the “100% location," while Genesee, Broadway, Eagle, and Seneca streets were significant connecting commercial strips.
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2 Map 2.The scene has drastically changed between 1951 and 2011. Red, or dead, space predomiFig. 40,
Dead Zones, 2011

nates the downtown landscape. Potentially active (green) frontages are reduced to non-contiguous fragments
unable to support sustained pedestrian activity. There is a difference in the quality of the space depicted by the
red lines as well. In 1951, the red lines most often indicated residential areas. In 2011, virtually all of the
residential uses have been eliminated, and the red lines represent blocks where parking lots or publicly exclusionary buildings dominate. Yellow dashed line indicates blocks cleared between 1964 and 1980 for the
Church Street Extension and the Elm-Oak corridor, and, at bottom, in 1958 for Thruway ramps.
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Fig. 41, Map 3. Figure-ground maps of commercially active and inactive street frontages clarifies the loss of
urban spatial quality between 1951 (left) and 2011 (right). Development policies that focused on wholesale
clearance of residential and commercial buildings undermined the commercial and social potential of downtown, over and above broader economic and transportation changes. Further, new construction and the creation
of “superblocks” emphasized “drivable destinations,” which repelled pedestrians. The Elm-Oak corridor and the
Church Street extension mall are wholly dead zones, and form spatial barriers inhibiting vitality.

!
!
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Notes
1 The shops and services themselves formed an employment and customer base of thousands. Just one
department store, Hengerer’s employed over 1,200 people at its sole location in 1913, the heyday of the
department store. (New York State Archives, Factory Investigating Commission General Wage Investigation data cards, 1912-1914. A3000-77, Box 71, No. 1503-1)
2 Kraus, Neil, Race, Neighborhoods, and Community Power: Buffalo Politics, 1934-1997. Albany
(2000): 48
3 Molotch, 1976. Molotch’s thesis was that the essence of a locality, expressed by its elites, is growth
itself, and the urban landscape the result of a competition for perceived growth-inducing resources. This
paper argues that the downtown Buffalo growth machine misperceived the factors underlying local
growth, and continues to do so.
4 Nirenstein, undated, c. 1947, unpaginated (Buffalo summary)
5 Erie County Real Property Tax Services, 2013
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ever had, but, because they are automobile-based and single-use areas, they fail to develop the complexity and usefulness of a traditional central place. Outer Alexandria, Virginia, and Mississauga, Ontario are
examples. For 30 years, a period of tremendous growth, that includes 70-story residential towers, Mississauga has tried to develop a “downtown,” to no avail. It remains a collection of isolated buildings and
shopping malls. (Personal site visit; for review of Mississauga City Hall and attempts to create a traditional town center, see Progressive Architecture, 1987 Jan., v.68, no.1, p.92-93)
8 Rae, 2003; Fogelson, 2001
9 Nevins, 1932
10 Lynch, 1932
11 “Crouch Report,” BECPL, 1934
12 Bailey, 1880
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17 Rae, 2003
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19 Nirenstein, c. 1947
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21 Walker, 2012
22 Gehl, 2010
23 ibid.
24 Presently two touted projects are underway; one is focused on an 800-car parking ramp at the foot of
Main Street and another an office and hotel project on Delaware Avenue and Chippewa Street that will
reduce the number of commercial spaces on the site from 18 to four, and have a 300-car parking ramp
paid for by the state.
25 Moretti, 2012
26 Census. gov, accessed 10/8/13
27. ”Eugene Polley, Conjuror of a Device That Changed TV Habits, Dies at 96,” New York Times, May
22, 2012
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28 If you wanted to find the busiest corners in a northeastern city, you’d look for the Fanny Farmer outlet.
Bulk chocolate, which the store specialized in, was an impulse item. In addition to being on the 100%
corner in Buffalo, Fanny Farmer was on or near the 100% corner in every market it chose to compete in. In
upstate New York, or example,. Syracuse had three stores on South Salina Street, two on South Jefferson;
Utica, two on Genesee Street, including one on locally famous “Busy Corner” at Bleecker Street; Schenectady, State & Jay; Rochester, three on Main Street, including Main & Clinton; Binghamton, Court & Commercial.
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and cheap parking proximate to retaiil was never a solution to decline or a precondition for revival, the Buffalo Office of Strategic Planning and the Erie Canal Harbor Development Corporation collaborated on a
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6/1/1951
51 It is pervasive to this day. The author found himself with a city councilman on an Elmwood Avenue
street corner looking at a typical 3-story commercial building. It was about 100 years old, golden brick
with Beaux Arts details. It housed a Chinese restaurant and a glass artisan’s studio and shop on the first
floor. The bricks around mortar joints had some staining from a century of rainwater dripping down the
facade. Unbidden, the councilman, looking at the building, exclaimed, “Tear that down.” The dilapidated
gas station across the street with was apparently okay with him. On another occasion, the author was
standing with a friend, an attorney, overlooking downtown from an office building. The attorney’s gaze
rested on a complex of buildings that incorporated a brick Italianate house built, perhaps, in the 1860’s
and occupied for decades by an electrical contractor. “What’s going on there? They should tear that
down.” In City Hall, according to a source who must remain anonymous, the phrase “Tear down dat shit”
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